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Abstract
Recent crises and the expansion of international financial arrangements have dramatically elevated the importance of cooperation between 
regional institutions and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). While the case for coordination between regional and multilateral insti-
tutions is generally accepted, however, the need to organize it on an ex ante basis is not fully appreciated. The relatively successful cooper-
ation among the European Commission, European Central Bank, and IMF on the European debt crisis is not likely to be easily replicated 
in joint programs for countries in other regions, moreover, and the costs of coordination failure could be very large. Recent innovations at 
the IMF, on the other hand, present opportunities for cooperation with regional facilities. This paper reviews (1) the case for organizing 
cooperation on an ex ante basis, (2) the policy and institutional matters that should be coordinated, (3) how East Asian arrangements in 
particular and the IMF might cooperate, and (4) an Interinstitutional Agenda of general principles, modalities, and institutional recom-
mendations. The G-20, member states, and institutions themselves should address this agenda proactively. 
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INTRODUCTION
Since its creation, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has coexisted with various bilateral, regional, 
and other multilateral financial facilities. These have ranged in character from the European Payments 
Union (EPU) established in the 1950s to the network of bilateral swap arrangements established by 
the Group of Ten (G-10) central banks during the 1960s and East Asia’s current Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralisation (CMIM). The IMF and its member states are thus fairly accustomed to cooperating 
with other arrangements and institutions in financial rescues in various regions, but they have done so in 
an ad hoc rather than systematic fashion over the years.
With the progressive increase in the frequency and severity of financial crises, expansion in the 
size and number of regional financial arrangements, and increase over the last decade in the level of 
international reserves, which can be placed at the disposal of bilateral and regional facilities, the necessity 
and complexity of coordinating these facilities with the IMF increases dramatically. These developments 
raise the stakes on policy issues associated with coordination—such as the relative contributions of 
regional and multilateral facilities, conditionality, terms, and negotiating modalities—and institutional 
issues—such as channels of communication, representation, and even membership. Given its momentum, 
regionalism probably poses the most important long-term challenge to the IMF and its role in the 
international monetary and financial system.
Three events make this agenda for cooperation between regional financial arrangements and the 
IMF particularly important at the moment. First, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus 
China, Japan, and Korea (ASEAN+3) has made the CMIM operational and is creating a surveillance 
unit based in Singapore in 2011. Second, the financial crisis in Europe’s Southern tier led to a rescue 
package for Greece of unprecedented size and the establishment of a new, nearly $1 trillion arrangement; 
that arrangement was then activated for Ireland in autumn 2010. Both the Greek and Irish programs 
mix European and IMF financing, and the stakes in mixed rescue packages have now become enormous. 
Finally, the IMF has conducted a review of its own financial facilities, expanded their scope, and launched 
an effort to engage regional financial arrangements through them.1 
It is important to recall that the member states lead the process of creating multilateral and regional 
financial facilities and amending them. Very few national governments have been content with relying 
solely on the IMF for balance of payments and other official financing. Most have engaged or contributed 
to bilateral, regional, and plurilateral financial facilities as well, including the large members with 
substantial weight in the IMF, such as the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Japan. But when 
1. On the IMF’s outreach to regional arrangements, see IMF, Seminar on Regional Financial Safety Nets, at 
 http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2010/spr/index.htm; Goretti, Lanau, and Ramakrishnan (2010); 
Giorgianni (2010); and Moghadam (2010).3
establishing new financial facilities or amending existing ones, these governments often gave short-shrift 
to, and sometimes ignored, the consequences of creating one facility for its older siblings.
The members of the Group of Twenty (G-20) hold 65.8 percent of the quotas and 64.7 percent of 
the votes of the IMF. At the same time, almost all of them participate in a bilateral or regional financial 
arrangement; one member, the European Union, is itself a regional organization that operates several 
financial arrangements. As essential players at all these levels, the members of the G-20 are best situated 
to mandate cooperation among them. Getting the relationship between regional and multilateral 
financial facilities right is critical to the effectiveness of global governance, moreover, and to successfully 
dispatching the recent economic crisis. The subject is thus an appropriate agenda item for the G-20 
finance ministers’ meetings and leaders’ summits.2 
In this paper, first, I briefly review the experience with recent joint programs that motivates this 
analysis. Second, I review the case for cooperation between regional financial institutions and the IMF. 
Third, I enumerate the specific issues—both policy and institutional—that arise when mixing regional 
with multilateral finance. Fourth, I compare the more important regional financial arrangements with 
respect to their posture toward the IMF. Fifth, I examine the relationship between the IMF and East Asian 
financial arrangements in particular, enumerating proposals for cooperation between them. I conclude by 
proposing an Interinstitutional Agenda of basic principles for organizing region-IMF cooperation, specific 
guidelines for a code of conduct, and institutional reforms. Such recommendations can guide the design 
and evolution of institutions at both levels.
The position advanced here supports both financial regionalism and multilateral norms and rules 
for regional arrangements. My argument thus occupies a middle ground between multilateral purists, 
who tend to privilege the IMF as the dominant, if not the exclusive, international instrument for fighting 
financial crises,3 and unbridled regionalists, who tend to promote regional arrangements unfettered by 
the IMF or multilateral rules.4 Both the IMF and regional financial arrangements are here to stay; a more 
reliable groundwork must be laid for their mutual coexistence and cooperation. 
The ultimate objective of the present exercise, to be clear, is to secure the economic and financial 
stability of member states and the international economic system. The prerogatives of multilateral and 
regional institutions might be of intense interest to officials in these organizations and the member states, 
2. The Korean presidency of the G-20 placed the subject on the agenda, the French presidency continues to pursue it, 
and the Camdessus Report on the Reform of the International Monetary System has reiterated the need for progress 
(Camdessus 2011, suggestion 12, p. 12).
3. Truman (2010), for example, strongly favors primacy for the IMF. 
4. Simon Johnson seems unqualified in his advocacy for an alternative to the IMF (“An IMF Just for Emerging Markets,” 
Business Week, October 8, 2009). Sussangkarn (2010) and Kawai (2009a, 24–25), among others, champion an Asian 
Monetary Fund that could abandon the requirement that CMIM lending be linked to the IMF. 4
and realism dictates sensitivity to these concerns, but securing or expanding bureaucratic turf is not the 
purpose of this paper. Cooperation between the IMF and regional institutions is thus advocated in order 
to foster stability. Proposals for innovative facilities and policies should be tested against this metric. 
A word about those topics that fall outside the scope of this study is in order. While this paper 
addresses conflict and cooperation between regional financial facilities and the IMF, it does not examine 
the normative case for either regional or multilateral institutions per se. It is premised on the conviction 
that the case for both is strong. Nor does the paper examine the broader issues of regional integration, 
reform of the IMF beyond the connection to regionalism, and global governance generally. These topics 
are the subject of numerous other studies.5 
RECENT EXPERIENCE
This study is inspired by a string of cases over the last decade and a half that have mixed bilateral, regional, 
and IMF funds in financial rescue programs (see appendix A). While successful, these programs raised 
important questions about cooperation and the division of labor across the financial facilities at the three 
different levels. At the outset of the 1997–98 Asian financial crisis, the Japanese Ministry of Finance 
famously advocated the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) that would not have included 
the United States and could have displaced the IMF from the region. As a substitute for the AMF 
proposal, which was not adopted, East Asian governments launched the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) 
in 2000 and, as mentioned, created the CMIM in 2010. However, the CMIM retains the “IMF link”—
which requires borrowers to negotiate a program with the IMF in order to obtain most of the regional 
funds—and it has not been activated. How ASEAN+3 would coordinate any activation of the CMIM 
with the Fund in practice remains vague and untested. 
Meanwhile, the recent global economic and financial crisis witnessed a series of new programs in 
which IMF funding was mixed with regional and bilateral assistance, first principally in Central and 
Eastern Europe, then in Greece and Ireland. The Latvian program is particularly instructive because it 
is a case where the Fund differed with the regional partner, the European Union, yet the conflict was 
successfully resolved.. When capital withdrawal became pronounced, Latvian authorities reportedly 
approached the IMF. European officials objected that Latvian officials were obligated to consult with 
them prior to such an approach and, once negotiations were under way, objected to the IMF’s proposed 
devaluation of the lats.6 Maintaining the peg to the euro required considerably greater austerity and a 
5. Reform of the IMF and the evolution of the G-20 are examined in Truman (2010), among a number of other places.
6. The European Union’s directive establishing the Balance of Payments facility requires consultation with the Economic 
and Financial Committee before approaching the IMF and Latvia’s membership in the Exchange Rate Mechanism II 
(ERMII) established the peg to the euro as a common policy of the European members, changes in which thus require a 
common decision. By contrast, Hungary and Romania were not members of the ERMII.5
much larger financing package than under the Fund’s original scenario. The IMF relented on the exchange 
rate condition and agreed to tighter fiscal and wage conditions, while the Europeans agreed to contribute 
the lion’s share of the financing through the European Union’s Balance of Payments Facility (€3.1 billion) 
and bilateral assistance from the Czech Republic, Poland, and the Nordic central banks (appendix 
A; Åslund 2010). The IMF also cooperated with the European Union on programs for Hungary and 
Romania and with bilateral supporters on a program for Iceland. 
The 2010 Greek program multiplied the stakes in regional-multilateral financial cooperation. 
Whereas the European Union could use the Balance of Payments Facility for members that had not 
yet adopted the euro, by deliberate design under the Maastricht Treaty Europe entered the recent crisis 
without an instrument to support financial stability in members of the monetary union. As Greece slid 
toward crisis in late 2009 and early 2010, the initial reaction of some European officials was to attempt 
to solve the problem solely “within the family,” that is, without the financial assistance of the IMF. By 
late March 2010 it had become apparent that was not practically feasible and Greece soon launched 
negotiations with the IMF, European Commission, and the European Central Bank (ECB). Greece’s 
package, announced in early May, provided for €30 billion from the IMF and €80 billion in bilateral 
loans from the 15 euro area partners, for a total of €110 billion—the largest ever international financial 
rescue package (appendix A). Cooperation on the design and negotiation of the package was remarkably 
effective at the staff level, as it had generally been on the Central and Eastern European programs; the 
concern for the future would be for cooperation at the political level if the Greek program took a turn for 
the worse and required debt restructuring.
Concerned about contagion to other countries within the euro area, including Portugal, Spain, 
Ireland, and Italy, European officials launched the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism (EFSM) 
and European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) simultaneously with the Greek program. Hoping 
to reverse the deterioration in market confidence once and for all, the finance ministers and heads of 
government set the total for the EFSF and EFSM together at €500 billion. Combined with a presumptive 
IMF contribution of €250 billion, the total available to the Southern tier was to be €750 billion, or 
roughly $1 trillion.7 These measures were agreed to at the Ecofin meeting that Spanish Finance Minister 
Elena Salgado chaired; she announced the IMF commitment at her press conference at the conclusion 
of the meeting. However, there is no institutional mechanism for the Fund to commit itself in advance 
to a hypothetical contingency, much less one of such an unprecedented magnitude. IMF Managing 
Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn was rhetorically supportive and the Fund is inclined to work jointly 
7. The size and speed of the IMF contributions to the Greek program and, as announced by European officials, further 
contingencies in Southern Europe generate charges of pro-European bias from some analysts sympathetic to Asia. See 
Kawai (2010); Devesh Kapur and Arvind Subramanian, “Wanted: A Truly International Monetary Fund,” Forbes, March 
29, 2009. 6
with European authorities in such contingencies, but the Executive Board would not decide the size and 
nature of any IMF contribution until it receives a request from the country concerned and negotiates the 
program. 
The new European arrangements were mobilized for the first time for Ireland in late 2010 jointly 
with an IMF program. The European Union through the EFSM, the euro area member states through 
the EFSF, and the IMF through the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) each contributed €22.5 billion. 
Combined with €17.5 billion of Ireland’s own liquid resources, the package totaled €85 billion. In early 
2011, however, a new Irish government sought to renegotiate the interest rate on the European loans and 
reopened the possibility of imposing a “haircut” on the holders of senior debt of Irish banks—sensitive 
matters of considerable debate among its official creditors. 
European leaders simultaneously agreed to create a permanent replacement for the (temporary) 
EFSF and the EFSM, which they named the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), and intended to 
ratify it as a limited change to the European treaties. The ESM, if adopted, would in many respects 
provide the functional equivalent of a European Monetary Fund. Nonetheless, the ESM proposal 
provides for continued involvement of the IMF, for example, in surveillance, program design, and the 
triggering of collective action clauses in sovereign bond contracts.8 As of this writing, European leaders 
were negotiating the broader package of fiscal and structural agreements with which the ESM might be 
adopted. 
The European experience raises two points. First, the region with the best-developed regional 
institutions, including a common currency and elaborate regional surveillance mechanism, was not 
sufficiently equipped to deal with a major financial emergency among one of its member governments. 
This should give pause, to say the least, to officials in other regions who want to chart a long-term 
path to autonomy from the IMF. ASEAN+3 in particular must realize that, although their surveillance 
mechanism, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), is scheduled to be launched 
soon, it is unlikely to approach the capacity needed to delink from the IMF with confidence as presently 
constituted. 
Second, despite having reluctantly turned to the IMF in the heat of the Greek crisis and 
incorporated a continuing role for the Fund in the ESM, several European officials regard this necessity 
as an embarrassment and wish to build the institutional infrastructure within the euro area that will 
someday obviate resort to the Fund. Such a movement would have substantial implications for (a) 
Europe’s relationship to the IMF and (b) other regions’ aspirations for similar regional monetary funds. 
However, European governments generally do not acknowledge, or perhaps even realize, that disallowing 
euro area member states from tapping the IMF would eliminate the functional basis for preserving 
8. European Council, Conclusions of the European Council, December 16–17, 2010, Brussels, January 25, 2011.7
separate national memberships in the institution. For the purposes of the IMF, these countries would 
have completely transferred their authorities to the euro area; joint membership in the IMF would be 
the logical consequence. Membership for the euro area as a whole might be desirable—as I have argued 
(Henning 1997)—but European governments could fail to draw the logical conclusion, which would 
weaken the IMF and its governance. 
THE CASE FOR COOPERATION BETWEEN THE IMF AND REGIONAL FACILITIES
Arguments for cooperation between regional financial arrangements and the IMF arise at two levels. The 
first level comprises arguments for interinstitutional cooperation in principle; the second level comprises 
rationales for organizing such cooperation specifically on an ex ante rather than an ad hoc basis. The 
general principles of cooperation are fairly broadly understood, but the case for organizing it on an ex 
ante basis is not yet widely accepted and deserves greater appreciation. This section considers both sets of 
arguments. 
The case for cooperation in principle between regional financial arrangements and the IMF rests 
on four enduring rationales.9 First, the existence of multiple institutions lends itself to forum shopping 
and institutional arbitrage.10 Competition among institutions might be desirable in some areas, but 
this does not extend to specification of the adjustment measures that might be necessary in country 
programs. Coordination is necessary to prevent institutions from attaching conflicting conditions to 
their financial support. Second, while some redundancy might be desirable in the international financial 
architecture, duplication should be deliberate and minimized. Third, multiplicity of financial facilities 
raises the possibility that what one contributes might be removed by the other facility. Interinstitutional 
coordination is necessary to ensure that resources provided at one level are additional rather than a 
substitute for resources provided at the other level. 
Fourth, there are mutual gains to be derived from division of labor and specialization along lines of 
comparative advantage at the two levels. Whereas regional institutions might have better local knowledge 
and ownership, for example, global multilateral institutions might be less vulnerable to backlash against 
austere conditionality. For a region that relies on unanimous approval of members by popular referenda 
for projects of integration, imposing domestically unpopular policy conditions might be politically 
dangerous however necessary they might be in economic terms. In such cases, the IMF might have a clear 
comparative advantage in specifying macroeconomic conditions on political grounds as well as expertise. 
9. See, among others, IMF, “The Fund’s Mandate—Future Financing Role,” background staff paper, March 25, 2010, 
paragraphs 34-36; Eichengreen (2006, 32–33); McKay, Volz, Wölfinger (2010); Henning (2002).
10. Displayed by Iceland, Pakistan, and Hungary in autumn 2008, for example.8
The relatively successful cooperation that the IMF and European institutions have recently exhibited 
was achieved on an ad hoc basis. Precedents might set a pattern and leading states might referee disputes, 
as in the recent cases in Central and Eastern Europe, but bilateral, regional, and multilateral partners 
hammered out the terms of cooperation anew in each instance. The IMF and regions have muddled 
through, generally finding a modus vivendi that produced satisfactory cooperation (though not necessarily 
satisfactory economic outcomes) on joint programs. Several considerations suggest, however, that this ad 
hoc approach is becoming increasingly risky over time. 
First, Europe offers an example of indecision, temporary though it was, over region-IMF 
cooperation. European authorities had no regional instrument with which to respond to financial crises 
within the euro area. When the Greek crisis struck, European authorities struggled over whether to 
respond on a regional basis or jointly with the IMF. The delay in turning to the IMF during February–
April 2010 was expensive: The size of the Greek package required to calm the markets rose from about 
€30 billion to €110 billion and a package that was roughly equivalent in size to the US Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP, which was $700 billion) became necessary in an effort to stem contagion 
elsewhere in the euro area. The episode illustrates the potential costs of cooperation failure and the value 
of ex ante arrangements among institutions. 
Second, the successful cooperation between the Fund and the European Union in the crises in 
Central and Eastern Europe, Greece, and Ireland is not likely to transfer easily to cooperation between 
the IMF and other regions. Europe is well represented in the IMF—many would argue that it is 
overrepresented even after recent reforms—and Europeans dominate the Executive Board numerically. 
The present managing director not only is a European but was integrally involved in the construction of 
the institutions of the monetary union as the finance minister of France. Both factors greatly facilitated 
EU-IMF cooperation in these cases but also distinguish Europe from the other regions. 
Finally, the frequency and severity of crises are likely to persist over the long term, and domestic 
political resistance to large financial packages and the adjustment conditions attached to them could well 
constrain policymakers who would be otherwise disposed to interinstitutional cooperation. The prospect 
that regional and multilateral institutions could fail to coordinate in the heat of a crisis and thus fail to 
stem (or even contribute to) financial turmoil—a “train wreck” scenario—is likely to increase over time, 
reinforcing the case for ex ante arrangements.    
Ultimately, the need for cooperation between regional and multilateral financial institutions inheres 
in their origins. Member states have created these facilities and institutions to serve their common 
purposes in fostering international economic openness. They have done so, however, often without regard 
to how the two levels should relate to each other. There is no formal hierarchy among the international 
and regional organizations; nor is there an explicit set of rules or formal conventions specifying how the 9
IMF should relate to regional organizations.11 Norms and informal conventions might apply but exercise 
relatively weak guidance for each new joint financial package and are subject to renegotiation. The most 
influential member states thus broker coordination in an ad hoc fashion as the need arises, in consultation 
with the senior management of the institutions. Satisfactory outcomes thus hinge on agreement among 
the powerful members. The process by which this is achieved is generally not at all transparent. 
ISSUES FOR COOPERATION
Several points of potential conflict arise between regional financial arrangements and the IMF and define 
the agenda for cooperation. Those points fall under the headings of (a) policy issues—specific elements 
of individual country programs that should be reconciled—and (b) institutional issues—the mandates, 
governance, and memberships of the regional arrangements and the IMF. This section highlights the 
policy issues, enumerates the institutional issues, and identifies a spectrum of possibilities for region-IMF 
cooperation. 
Policy Issues
Several specific issues arise when regional and multilateral arrangements are called upon to work together. 
Though these issues are fairly evident, the solutions can be complex and agreement on them cannot be 
taken for granted. 
Contributions. The first question that arises in a joint financial rescue by the IMF and a regional 
financial facility is the size of the overall package and the relative contributions of the participants. 
Sometimes the IMF takes a dominant share; in other cases the IMF takes a minority share. The mix has 
ramifications for (a) the adequacy of the package, (b) relative influence of the contributors, and thus (c) 
conditions attached to the program. There is a clear sense that “he who pays the piper calls the tune.”12 
Terms of Assistance. The maturity, interest rate, currency, and possibility for renewal are standard 
elements of loans and other financial arrangements. These have ramifications for which creditor would be 
drawn upon most heavily and be repaid first and most profitably. The terms do not have to be uniform, 
but the collective action problems must be addressed. The same can be said for provisions relating to 
collateral, default, collective action clauses, and recourse. 
11. Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Article 5 of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) provide such rules in the international trade regime.
12. See, for example, Gould (2003).10
Policy Conditionality. The policy adjustments required of the borrower can be highly controversial. 
Will there be one global standard for adjustment and financing or several regional standards?13 Which 
institution, the IMF or the regional facility, sets the policy conditions in joint packages? How are conflicts 
over conditionality resolved? What is the mechanism for resolving them? 
Negotiating Modalities. How is the mission that is sent to negotiate the program with the borrower 
composed? Who conducts the analytical work on the spot? How is a joint position, if there is one, 
prepared? Who takes the lead in the actual negotiations? Recent experiences with IMF/EU programs 
in Central and Eastern Europe, Greece, and Ireland provide some ad hoc answers to these questions. 
Whether these are positive models or negative models depends on one’s particular perspective within these 
organizations. 
Transparency. International financial facilities differ greatly with respect to disclosure regarding terms of 
programs and institutional decision making. In joint operations, whose transparency protocol should be 
followed, that of the most or least transparent institution? My answer would be the most transparent; but 
practice has often followed the least common denominator.
Bailouts of Regions. The question arises of whether one official creditor would be taking on the exposure 
of other official creditors over the course of a crisis. If a regional facility mishandles an operation, the IMF 
could be called upon to take over the program or, if the crisis has become pan-regional in the meantime, 
rescue multiple countries in the region. At that point, any refusal by the IMF could endanger systemic 
stability and generate opposition among members, placing the IMF in a disadvantageous position. 
Central banks, finance ministries, and the IMF alike are thus concerned about being excluded from 
decision making during an initial stage of a rescue and then, when the crisis has become more acute, 
inheriting the operation in a subsequent stage.14 
Bilateral and regional creditors have sometimes extended bridge financing and been subsequently 
reimbursed with the proceeds of an IMF loan. Bridge financing should be distinguished from an 
inherited rescue, however. An expectation that the IMF and the borrower will be agreeing upon a 
program accompanies the case of bridge financing and the Fund specifies requisite policy conditions at 
the outset. In the inherited-rescue scenario, by contrast, the IMF would not have the opportunity to 
13. A question posed by Truman (2010, 6).
14. Article VI, section 1 of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement state, “A member shall not use the Fund’s general resources to 
meet a large or sustained outflow of capital . . ..” This provision could in principle be used to block the use of a drawing 
to repay a regional fund. But the Executive Board would be unlikely to invoke this clause if doing so could create or 
perpetuate a systemic problem. 11
design the program at the outset, giving rise to a take-it-or-leave-it proposition that the Fund could have 
difficulty refusing. 
Exit sequencing can become a barrier to regional-multilateral coordination even in cases where 
the rescue is successful. For example, the maximum rollover duration of the CMIM swaps (two years) 
is shorter than the standard IMF Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) (three-and-a-quarter to five years). 
Some ASEAN+3 officials might be tempted to conclude that, should the CMIM be activated with the 
IMF link, their credits through the CMIM would be redeemed prior to the IMF’s.15 But this would 
be a misunderstanding, as the Executive Board would almost certainly insist that any regional credits 
be renewed until they and IMF credits can be repaid simultaneously.16 Doing so would require a 
renegotiation of a key provision of the CMIM, however. Again, this type of issue should be discussed and 
resolved in advance of, rather than in the heat of, a financial crisis.
Seniority. Relatedly, situations of mixed finance naturally raise the question of the relative seniority of 
the creditors. In rescue packages involving the IMF, the Fund has always been at the head of the queue; it 
has held “preferred creditor status.” But this seniority is not conferred by the IMF Articles of Agreement; 
rather it has been enshrined by convention with the support of its key members, borrowers, and the 
deference of private and official bilateral creditors.17 The Executive Board and management of the Fund 
have therefore had to be vigilant in extracting this provision from the parties to rescue packages in each 
instance. It should not be taken for granted that other official creditors, including regional financial 
facilities, will always defer to the IMF on this matter. 18 Conflicts over preferred creditor status could 
consume valuable time and energy during negotiations in a financial crisis.
Institutional Issues
Beyond the nitty-gritty of how to organize a financial rescue, several institutional questions arise in the 
relationship between regional financial arrangements and the IMF. The first has to do with organization 
for external representation. Does the region form a common position on external matters and, if so, 
15. During the 1960s, there were several instances when G-10 central bank swaps were redeemed with borrowing from the 
IMF (Cooper 2006, 6–8; Borio and Toniolo 2006). 
16. See, for example, Mark Allen and Raghuram Rajan, “Reserve Pooling Arrangements and the Fund,” IMF 
memorandum to the managing director and deputy managing directors, Washington, March 21, 2006.
17. Martha (1990), Rieffel (2003), and Gelpern (2005).
18. The IMF’s status relative to Europe’s new EFSF is preserved; see Nina Koeppen, “Klaus Regling Explains the EU’s 
Stability Fund,” Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2010, available at wsj.com; EFSF, “The European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF)—FAQ,” available at http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachment/faq_en.pdf. The Eurogroup finance ministers have 
taken a similar posture with respect to the relative status of the proposed ESM and the IMF, declaring in November 2010, 
“. . . an ESM loan will enjoy preferred creditor status, junior only to the IMF loan.” European Council, Conclusions of the 
European Council, December 16–17, 2010, Brussels, January 25, 2011, Annex II, paragraph 6. 12
through what governing body and decision rule? Who represents the region in the multilateral institution 
(IMF) and vis à vis governments outside the region? A similar set of questions applies to the IMF: How 
does the IMF receive the representation of the regions and how does it act on proposals from them? 
Through what instruments and procedures can the IMF strike agreements with regions? 
A second set of institutional questions relates to voting and governance. We would expect that 
representation of countries in the IMF would facilitate the Fund’s cooperation with their region. 
Specifically, the weight of member states from a particular region in the quota and voting structure of the 
IMF, and the presence of officials from the region in the Fund’s senior staff, is likely to affect the Fund’s 
cooperation with the region. We have already observed that EU-IMF cooperation was facilitated by 
the numerical dominance of Europe on the Executive Board and the regional identity of the managing 
director. This need not be a question of favoritism, but rather a matter of knowledge of the region 
inside the IMF, and vice versa, multiplicity of points of contact at the working level, and convergence of 
analytical views. 
A third set of questions relates to eligibility for membership. Presently, membership in regional 
financial arrangements and the IMF is restricted to member states. One might reasonably ask whether 
membership could be expanded to include regional institutions in the IMF—as the European Union 
is a member in its own right in the WTO—and the IMF in regional organizations.19 Observer status is 
common in international organizations and can be quite useful but generally does not allow institutions 
to draw on the resources of the organization in question. 
Spectrum of Cooperation
There is a spectrum of possible ways in which regional financial facilities can cooperate with the IMF 
and vice versa. These range from technical to policy and then to institutional modalities for cooperation 
and can be arrayed in order of the degree to which the two institutions sacrifice autonomy. At the less 
ambitious end of the spectrum, where each institution retains maximum independence, would be IMF 
advice and technical assistance on the establishment of regional facilities and regional surveillance mecha-
nisms. Periodic or regular IMF contributions to regional surveillance exercises, through for example 
presentations of Fund staff to meetings of regional officials, are also at the “easy” end of the spectrum. 
Parallel financing arrangements—where for example the regional financial arrangement ties its lending 
19. Henning (1997, 50–57; 2006), among others, argues that Europe’s monetary union should be given membership 
in the IMF. However, eligibility for membership of the region in the multilateral institution should be conditioned on 
the region’s decision rule—that it establish its common position by majority rather than unanimity or consensus. Under 
unanimity or consensus, one country or a small group of countries could exercise a veto over important decisions in the 
IMF by virtue of their blocking position in the region—the “double-veto” problem. This caveat deserves more attention 
than it often receives. 13
to Fund program or vice versa—are more ambitious. Contributing partnerships, where one institution 
contributes funds that are lent on terms negotiated by the other, are substantially more ambitious still. 
Providing for membership of the region in the IMF, or vice versa, would represent the ambitious end 
point of the spectrum. Consider these as we discuss, later below, the possibilities by which the IMF might 
cooperate with East Asian financial facilities and surveillance.
COMPARISON OF REGIONAL FACILITIES
More than six decades of institution building have generated a substantial list of regional financial 
arrangements, ranging from those with close links to the IMF to those without. These arrangements vary 
considerably in size, mandate, and effectiveness and are compared in detail elsewhere.20 The particular 
relationship between these arrangements and the IMF is of primary interest here and is summarized in 
table 1. Consider for a moment the regional financial arrangements in Europe, the Americas, and East 
Asia below.
The members of the European Union have operated balance of payments and short-term financing 
facilities since the 1970s. The Balance of Payments Facility offers medium-term financial assistance 
for non-euro-area countries, is presently endowed with €50 billion, and has loans outstanding to 
Latvia, Hungary and Romania. The short-term and very-short-term facilities supported the European 
Snake in the Tunnel in the 1970s and the European Monetary System in the 1980s and 1990s and 
the very-short-term facility supports the present Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II). While 
reinforcing European integration, both sets of arrangements substantially circumscribed the financing 
and surveillance role of the IMF within Europe.21 Member states are formally obligated to consult with 
the European Union before seeking financial assistance from the IMF or other international financial 
institutions.22 While balance of payments loans have sometimes been made without IMF cofinancing, the 
recent programs have been linked to Fund programs. 
In the wake of the 2010 Greek crisis, the European Union added a European Financial Stabilization 
Mechanism, endowed with €60 billion available to members both inside and outside the euro area, and 
the European Financial Stability Facility, endowed with €440 billion, designed for members of the euro 
area only.23 The EFSM is a permanent facility, reviewed every six months, whereas the EFSF is slated for 
20. See, for example, Henning (2002, 49–62); McKay, Volz, and Wölfinger (2010); Lombardi (2010).
21. Truman (2010) suggests that it was a mistake, in retrospect, for the rest of the Fund membership to accede to the 
Fund’s diminished role in Europe. 
22. EU Council Regulation No. 332/2002, Article 2, available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2002:053:0001:0003:EN:PDF. 
23. Buiter (2010) contains a useful overview of the new European arrangements. See, also, “EFSF Framework Agreement,” 
Paris, June 7, 2010; Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, “European Financial Stability Facility,” articles of incorporation, 
Luxembourg, June 7, 2010.14
closure in June 2013 or until outstanding loans are repaid, whichever is later. As a matter of policy, both 
the EFSM and the EFSF would cooperate with the IMF in any activation in the near future, a provision 
strongly reinforced by domestic political imperatives of some member states. But neither facility is legally 
bound to lend only in parallel with the IMF and, although the ESM proposal retains an important 
role for the IMF, a number of officials in Europe continue to harbor independence from the Fund as a 
long-term aspiration. 
Several arrangements exist for the benefit of countries in the Western Hemisphere, including 
the North American Framework Agreement (NAFA) and the Latin American Reserve Fund (LARF or 
FLAR). Although not a regional arrangement, the Exchange Stabilization Fund (ESF) operated by the 
US Treasury has been the most active nonmultilateral facility within the region. The vast majority of 
the more than 115 credit arrangements entered into by the ESF since its creation in 1934 have been for 
the benefit of Latin American countries, the most substantial of which was the $20 billion commitment 
to Mexico in 1995 (Henning 1999, table 1). US law directs the secretary of the Treasury to use the 
account in a manner “consistent with the obligations of the Government to the International Monetary 
Fund” and the Treasury secures a letter from the managing director certifying borrowers’ policies in each 
instance (Henning 2002, 66–68). But the secretary is not restricted to using the ESF only in concert 
with IMF financing. 
Despite being inspired in substantial measure by antipathy toward the IMF in East Asia, the CMI 
and CMIM are more explicitly linked to the IMF than any of the other important regional facilities. 
Members of ASEAN+3 must negotiate an IMF program to draw beyond 20 percent of their CMIM 
allotment, a provision known in the region as the “IMF link.” Although the first 20 percent can be 
significantly larger than the borrower’s quota in the IMF, it is likely to be at best only a first tranche in a 
much larger program, given the volume of financing needed in recent crises. A number of Southeast Asian 
officials would like to reduce or eliminate the IMF link, and ASEAN+3 reviews it periodically, but the 
likely creditor countries continue to support it. 
EAST ASIA AND THE IMF
ASEAN+3 made the CMIM operational in March 2010. The CMIM is a “self-managed reserve pooling 
arrangement,” which means that foreign exchange reserves are held in separate national accounts but 
earmarked for contributions to financial rescue packages when the need arises and the group decides to 
activate. The importance of this step lies in (a) the inclusion of the low-income ASEAN countries and 
Hong Kong and China in these arrangements for the first time, (b) making disbursements subject to 
a single decision of the group as a whole rather than separate decisions of the creditor countries, and 
especially (c) agreement on the governing arrangements, including the relative shares of Japan, China, and 15
South Korea. Korean and Japanese officials subsequently proposed that the resources of the CMIM be 
doubled, to $240 billion, and made available on a precautionary basis.24
ASEAN+3 has also agreed to create an independent secretariat in 2011 in Singapore in order to 
backstop regional surveillance. The hope of many, distant though it might be, is that a robust surveillance 
mechanism will permit the CMIM to eventually lend without the borrower also negotiating an IMF 
program, which is now a requirement. Such a step would complete the transition of East Asian financial 
arrangements to an Asian monetary fund. These arrangements and their evolution over time have been 
examined elsewhere;25 this section addresses the relationship between CMIM, the surveillance unit, and 
the IMF to examine proposals for interinstitutional cooperation that could be generalized to the IMF’s 
relationship to other regions. Consider first cooperation in the area of surveillance, then in the area of 
financial support.
Surveillance
Regional surveillance of economic policy has developed gradually over more than a decade within 
ASEAN+3.26 Consensus emerged only within the last few years on the creation of an independent secre-
tariat to conduct policy reviews and on the secretariat’s location. In spring 2010, it was finally decided 
that the new surveillance secretariat, named the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office, will be 
located in Singapore.27 ASEAN+3 finance ministers declared their intention that AMRO become opera-
tional in 2011.28 AMRO’s mandate is to “monitor and analyze regional economies, which contributes to 
the early detection of risks, swift implementation of remedial actions, and effective decision-making of the 
CMIM.” It will collect and analyze information on the economic and financial conditions and policies of 
members and present its analysis to the deputies and ministers in meetings of the Economic Review and 
Policy Dialogue (ERPD) and the governing bodies of the CMIM. The mandate is thus limited to infor-
24. Jeung-Hyun Yoon, remarks to the Conference for the Future Vision of ASEAN+3 Financial Cooperation, Seoul, 
Republic of Korea, February 11, 2011; “Japan to Propose Asian Precautionary Credit Line at G-20,” Jiji Press English 
News Service, February 17, 2011. 
25. Sussangkarn (2010); Henning (2002, 2009a, and 2011); Grimes (2009 and 2011); Hamada, Reszat, and Volz (2009); 
Kawai (2009b); Capannelli and Filippini (2009); Park and Wyplosz (2008); Kapur and Webb (2007); Eichengreen (2002); 
Amyx (2008); Lee (2006); Park and Wang (2005); Rajan and Sirigar (2004); ADB (2004); Cohen (2003); Bergsten and 
Park (2002); Bird and Rajan (2002); Kawai and Kuroda (2002); Katada (2001); Kim and Wang (2001); and Bergsten 
(1998), among others.
26. Contributions on ASEAN+3 surveillance include Kawai and Houser (2007), Institute for International Monetary 
Affairs (2005), Wang and Yoon (2002), Kawai (2009b), Henning (2009), and Takagi (2010). 
27. ASEAN Finance Ministers, Joint Media Statement of the 14th Meeting, Nha Trang, Vietnam, April 8, 2010, 
paragraph 14, available at http://www.aseansec.org/24491.htm (accessed on August 30, 2010).
28. ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers, Joint Media Statement, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, May 2, 2010, available at  
http://www.aseansec.org/documents/JMS_13th_AFMM+3.pdf (accessed on August 30, 2010).16
mation and analysis; it is not charged with developing proposals and submitting them to the board as is 
the managing director and staff of the IMF. AMRO’s staff will be relatively modest in size at the outset. 
While ASEAN+3 officials agreed that AMRO and its director are to be “independent,” the working 
relationships are yet to be established. 
Agreement on establishing AMRO raises another set of questions about how the office will relate to 
a series of other surveillance bodies and mechanisms in which the members of ASEAN+3 participate. First 
is ASEAN itself, which has created a new Macroeconomic and Financial Surveillance Office within the 
ASEAN secretariat.29 A second is the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and its secretariat, which includes 
the Office of Regional Economic Integration (OREI), and produces among other reports the Asian 
Development Outlook. Both have made presentations to the ERPD meetings of the ASEAN+3 deputies in 
recent years and are expected to assist during the establishment of AMRO as well.
A third interlocutor for AMRO is the IMF, which conducts the most robust surveillance of the 13 
members of ASEAN+3 on an annual basis and makes its findings available to all of the other members. 
The Article IV consultations staff reports and Executive Board reviews are made available to all of the 
members, as of course are the Fund’s Regional Economic Outlook: Asia and Pacific, World Economic 
Outlook, and Global Financial Stability Report. Although officials within the region have in the past 
sometimes been quietly exasperated at the lectures that they have received through these vehicles, they 
also receive a great deal of high-quality information about their neighbors within the region through these 
multilateral channels.
Against the background of IMF bilateral and multilateral surveillance, one might reasonably ask 
what value-added AMRO might provide. AMRO will probably be too small to replicate the work of the 
IMF; it would be wise to identify a division of labor. There are several possible answers to this question. 
AMRO could in principle (1) provide contrasting assessments of vulnerabilities within the region when 
the director and staff disagree with the findings of the IMF; (2) update assessments more frequently than 
the annual cycle for Article IV consultations by the Fund staff; (3) backstop a surveillance discussion in 
which Asian officials might be more candid with one another than in the presence of officials from outside 
the region; and (4) otherwise provide a greater sense of Asian ownership.30
29. ASEAN Finance Ministers, Joint Media Statement of the 13th Annual Meeting, Pattaya, Thailand, April 9, 2009, 
paragraph 15, available at http://www.aseansec.org/22483.htm (accessed on August 30, 2010).
30. A recent report by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) suggests that, despite the assets of the IMF, there is 
substantial room to debate the conclusions of the Fund regarding financial soundness. The report mainly criticizes staff 
and the Executive Board for failing to sound alarms when warnings were necessary, rather than vice versa. See IEO, IMF 
Performance in the Run-Up to the Financial and Economic Crisis: IMF Surveillance in 2004–07, Washington, January 10, 
2011.17
Mindful that independence of AMRO from the IMF might be important to preserve, there are 
nonetheless several ways in which the two could cooperate. First, the IMF can provide technical advice 
during the establishment of AMRO, as Asian institutions are also likely to do. Second, the IMF can 
continue to brief the ASEAN+3 deputies at their surveillance discussions from time to time, as it has done 
in the past. Third, if AMRO is to specialize in its comparative advantages vis à vis the Fund, per above, it 
will have to consult with the Fund fairly intensively on the timing, sequencing, and even the substance of 
the Article IV consultations. 
Fourth, and more deeply, Kawai (2009a) has proposed that AMRO officials be included in the 
Fund’s Article IV surveillance missions to ASEAN+3 countries. Doing so might raise some sensitive 
issues, including with respect to the autonomy of AMRO’s analysis, but deserves serious consideration. 
The IMF adapted its surveillance procedures to accommodate the bifurcation of monetary and fiscal 
policymaking in euro area member states and has included European officials in negotiations over 
programs and conditionality. AMRO officials would benefit from being similarly embedded in IMF 
Article IV missions and such cooperation could facilitate agreement on policy adjustments to be required 
as conditions for activating their respective facilities for a member.
It is useful to underscore that the development of regional surveillance has critical ramifications for 
the East Asia’s long-term relationship to the IMF. At the outset of the CMI, Asian officials acknowledged 
that surveillance would have to evolve in parallel with regional financial facilities if the region were to 
become genuinely self-reliant. Were the region to sever the IMF link in particular, ASEAN+3 would have 
to first establish a robust surveillance mechanism that would allow the group to define its own policy 
conditionality for the CMI/CMIM. Although the effectiveness of AMRO remains to be seen, it does 
not appear that ASEAN+3 officials have yet devoted the resources or mustered the commitment to raise 
regional surveillance to this level. For the time being, it appears, the CMIM will cooperate with the IMF 
in any activation of its arrangements.
Cofinancing
From the beginning, any CMI disbursements would have been linked to Fund programs. While it was 
understood among ASEAN+3 that a plain vanilla Stand-By Arrangement constituted a “program,” 
however, it was not at all clear whether other sorts of IMF credit arrangements could also meet that 
description. Could borrowings under the other “windows” of the IMF qualify? Before the IMF retired 
its Contingent Credit Line (CCL) in 2003, for example, several analysts proposed that ASEAN+3 agree 
that CCL prequalification satisfy the definition of an “IMF program.”31 This question became especially 
relevant when the IMF created a menu of new facilities during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, 
31. See, for example, Henning (2002, 90–91).18
including the Flexible Credit Line (FCL),32 and then enhanced the FCL and introduced the Precautionary 
Credit Line (PCL) in August 2010.33 With these new facilities, the IMF has responded to the crisis with 
alacrity and has done so in large measure to address the preferences of East Asian members in particular. 
These facilities create in turn new opportunities for cooperation between the IMF and regional financial 
facilities, including CMIM.
Under the enhanced FCL, countries with “very strong economic fundamentals” and policies can 
qualify for an IMF credit line, on which they can draw at their option without submitting to ex post 
conditionality. There is no general limit on their access—the Executive Board decides on the size of the 
line based on the financing needs of each qualifying country—the line can be accessed for one or two 
years, and any drawings would be repaid over three-and-a-quarter to five years. Poland, Mexico, and 
Colombia have qualified for the FCL, though none of them have actually drawn on this facility.34 
Despite informal entreaties from the IMF and other actors, however, no Asian country has formally 
requested FCL qualification to date.35 I have argued that qualification for the FCL should be deemed to 
satisfy the ASEAN+3 requirement that disbursements under the CMIM beyond the first 20 percent be 
linked to a Fund program. (Henning 2009a) Such a determination by the ASEAN+3 finance ministers or 
deputies would (a) facilitate activation of the CMIM, (b) soften the stigma of the Fund, and (c) make the 
FCL more attractive to Asian members. 
Another avenue for CMIM-IMF cooperation arises from introduction of a facility complementary 
to the FCL called the Precautionary Credit Line. During the reform of Fund facilities during the recent 
crisis, the Executive Board recognized a need for precautionary support for countries that did not qualify 
for an FCL. It thus provided for High-Access Precautionary Arrangements (HAPAs), which allowed 
countries to borrow under an SBA but did not obligate them to do so as had previously been the case.36 
32. IMF, “IMF Implements Major Lending Improvements,” March 24, 2009, available at 
 http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/fac/2009/032409.htm. Earlier papers relating to these innovations include Ostry and 
Zettelmeyer (2005) and Rajan (2006).
33. IMF, “The Fund’s Mandate—Future Financing Role,” public information notice No. 10/51, April 22, 2010, available 
at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2010/pn1051.htm; “IMF Enhances Crisis Prevention Toolkit,” press release no. 
10/321, August 30, 2010, at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10321.htm. 
34. See, for example, IMF, Mexico: Arrangement under the Flexible Credit Line, IMF Country Report no. 11/11, January 
2011, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr1111.pdf. Mexico requested and was granted access up 
to 15 times its quota. 
35. IMF, The Fund’s Mandate—Future Financing Role, background staff paper, March 25, 2010, 20–24,
 http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/032510a.pdf.
36. Three countries obtained HAPAs during the recent crisis, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El Salvador. See IMF, Factsheet: 
IMF Stand-By Arrangement, November 23, 2009, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sba.htm. See also 
IMF, Review of the Fund’s Financing Role in Member Countries, background staff paper, March 28, 2008; IMF, The Fund’s 
Financing Facilities for Low Income Members, background staff paper, February 25, 2009; IMF, GRA Lending Toolkit and 19
Building on the HAPA, the PCL applies to countries “with good policies but still facing some remaining 
vulnerabilities,” which would therefore have to commit to light ex post conditionality and be monitored. 
Compared to the FCL, a broader set of countries can thus qualify for a PCL. A country can receive five 
times its quota on approval of a PCL, with up to ten times its quota available after 12 months.37
With the introduction of the PCL, two questions arise: (a) whether PCL qualification should 
also be deemed to satisfy the link and (b) whether the Fund and CMIM could cooperate in parallel 
disbursements. An ASEAN+3 decision to allow PCL qualification to satisfy the link would harness the 
expertise and analysis of the IMF to the resources of the CMIM in a precautionary framework—a useful 
division of labor. In considering such a move, ASEAN+3 might be wary of the possibility of CMIM 
disbursing without cofinancing from the Fund, as PCL qualifying members are granted access without the 
obligation to draw. (The same benefit and complication arise with respect to FCL qualification.) A logical 
solution would be to agree that the borrower would draw on both facilities equiproportionately. 
The IMF’s approach of offering different facilities to different categories of countries—“tiering”—
has important implications for the solidarity of ASEAN+3 and ASEAN, as it does for other regional 
groupings. Not all of the members of ASEAN are likely to qualify for an FCL, and some might not 
qualify for a PCL either. The emerging-market38 and low-income39 countries of Southeast Asia face 
different circumstances and challenges and the IMF will not be willing to treat them similarly in 
lending programs. These differences create a moderate hurdle to ASEAN+3 agreement on FCL or 
PCL qualification as satisfying the IMF link. If heterogeneous regions are to cooperate with the Fund, 
however, they must accept objectively based differential treatment of their members. Such differences are 
commonly recognized within ASEAN arrangements, though also in the different contributions and access 
rules under the CMIM.40 
Officials of ASEAN+3 are examining the possibility of activating the CMIM on a precautionary 
basis.41 Should they take this step, which would require overcoming any resistance to intraregional tiering, 
Conditionality: Reform Proposals, background staff paper, March 13, 2009. Concessional arrangements are reviewed in 
“IMF Backs New Package to Support World’s Poorest during Crisis, IMF Survey, July 29, 2009, available at
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/POL072909A.htm. 
37. IMF, “IMF Enhances Crisis Prevention Toolkit,” press release no. 10/321, August 30, 2010, available at  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10321.htm. 
38. Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and perhaps Brunei Darussalam fall in this category.
39. Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar.
40. ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers, Joint Media Statement, Bali, Indonesia, May 3, 2009, available at  
http://www.aseansec.org/22536.htm (accessed on August 30, 2010); ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers, Joint Media Statement, 
Tashkent, Uzbekistan, May 2, 2010, available at http://www.aseansec.org/documents/JMS_13th_AFMM+3.pdf (accessed 
on August 30, 2010).
41. “Japan to Propose Asian Precautionary Credit Line at G-20,” Jiji Press English News Service, February 17, 2011.20
CMIM would be able to qualify members and undertake precautionary disbursements in parallel with 
the IMF. Precautionary disbursement is not possible under the present CMIM agreement, however, and it 
will take substantial deliberation before ASEAN+3 would be likely to agree on such an important change 
to their regional financial architecture. 
Finally, the Fund staff has also proposed a Global Stabilization Mechanism (GSM), inspired in 
part by the currency swap extended by the US Federal Reserve to the Bank of Korea in autumn 2008.42 
The swaps extended by the Federal Reserve were designed to help foreign central banks aid their private 
banks in grappling with liquidity crises in the dollar funding markets, not to address balance of payments 
problems directly. When the interbank market dried up after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 
September 2008, banks turned to their central banks to re-fund their positions. The swaps extended by 
the Federal Reserve supplied foreign central banks with dollar liquidity, which was in turn auctioned 
to banks needing to refinance in dollars. The Federal Reserve extended these swaps to 14 central banks, 
including four emerging markets—Mexico, Brazil, Singapore, and Korea. At the peak, in early 2009, the 
Federal Reserve extended almost $600 billion through these swap lines.43 The drawings were particularly 
effective in calming financial markets in Korea. 
As is now being proposed, the GSM would similarly offer short-term liquidity in large amounts 
to combat a systemic or regional financial shock. To avoid loss of confidence in first movers, overcome 
IMF stigma, and accelerate decision making, the Fund could unilaterally offer FCLs or PCLs to multiple 
countries simultaneously, rather than wait for individual countries to request them, or, more ambitiously, 
activate a dedicated Short-Term Liquidity Line (SLL).44 Like central bank swaps, these lines would be 
conditionality-free. Eligibility would be restricted to those countries whose instability could threaten 
confidence in global financial markets. But the Fund could nonetheless offer these liquidity lines to a 
broader set of countries than the Federal Reserve might wish to provide swaps. In this way, the IMF 
and leading central banks could establish a complementary division of labor.45 When authorizing the 
enhancement of the FCL and introduction of the PCL, however, the IMF’s Executive Board balked at 
42. Previously referred to as the Multi-country Swap Line (MSL), Multi-country Credit Line (MCL), or simply “financial 
safety net.” See, for example, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, “Listening to and Learning from Asia,” Huffington Post, July 15, 
2010, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dominique-strausskahn/listening-to-and-learning_b_647534.html 
(accessed on August 30, 2010). See also Moghadam (2010), Giorgianni (2010), and Choi (2010).
43. The Bank of Japan was also a heavy user of the swaps. The Monetary Authority of Singapore, by contrast, did not 
draw.
44. An SLL would require approval by an 85 percent majority in the Board. 
45. IMF, The Fund’s Mandate—Future Financing Role, background staff paper, March 25, 2010, 26–28; IMF, The Fund’s 
Mandate—The Future Financing Role: Reform Proposals, staff paper, June 29, 2010, 12–23.21
the creation of the GSM. But the Board agreed to consider the GSM further and the French chair of the 
G-20 is keeping the proposal on the agenda.46 
There are a couple ways in which the GSM, were it created, might relate to ASEAN+3, the 
CMIM, and other regional financial arrangements. As demonstrated in previous crises, financial 
contagion has a strong regional dimension. Some countries in East Asia, such as Japan, South Korea, and 
Singapore, could perhaps renew their recent swaps with the Federal Reserve, while Chinese banks are 
unlikely to have dollar funding needs for the foreseeable future. Any contingency under which a newly 
created GSM or SLL would be activated would thus likely involve instead the financially open, larger 
emerging-market countries of Southeast Asia—Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. 
The low-income members and Brunei Darussalam would not meet the systemic-significance threshold 
or even likely need such liquidity; Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam would instead qualify for 
low-income assistance.47 
Under such a scenario, could the CMIM be mobilized in parallel with the GSM or SLL? As a 
regionalization of short-term, renewable, bilateral swaps, the CMIM could offer liquidity of a duration 
that would be comparable to some versions of the GSM proposal.48 The borrowing capacity of each of 
the ASEAN-5 is about $11.4 billion under the CMIM, totaling about $57 billion. The Bank of Korea’s 
borrowing capacity was $30 billion under the Federal Reserve swap during 2008–2009; its peak drawing 
was about $18 billion. CMIM resources are thus sufficient to make a serious contribution under such a 
contingency and they would have the advantage of regional ownership. 
Three caveats would nonetheless apply. First, should contagion spill over from Southeast Asia 
to Northeast Asian creditors, the CMIM would be impaired. Under such a scenario, the universal 
risk pooling of the IMF would be essential. Second, ASEAN+3 would have to decide to make the 
CMIM available to provide liquidity for the banking and financial system, as opposed to the short- 
to medium-term balance of payments needs of the member states. Third, again, Southeast Asian 
governments would have to overcome resistance to the tiering of the members. A regionwide crisis would 
46. IMF, “IMF Enhances Crisis Prevention Toolkit,” press release no. 10/321, August 30, 2010, available at  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2010/pr10321.htm; Truman (2006 and 2010, 5); John Lipsky, Assessing the 
Agenda for Economic Policy Cooperation, speech to the IMF Conference on Macro and Growth Policies in the Wake of 
the Crisis, Washington, March 7, 2011.
47. The Rapid Credit Facility, Stand-By Credit Facility, and Extended Credit Facility provide concessional finance for 
low-income countries, which the IMF revamped in mid-2009. See, IMF, “IMF Announces Unprecedented Increase in 
Financial Support to Low-Income Countries,” press release no. 09/268, July 29, 2009, available at 
 http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pr09268.htm. 
48. Under the staff proposal, the SLL would have a repurchase period of 1¼ to 2 years and charges the same as the credit 
tranches. CMIM drawings have 90-day maturity and are renewable seven times for a total of up to two years; interest 
charges are based on LIBOR plus 150 basis points at the initial drawing and first renewal, rising 50 basis points with each 
renewal up to a ceiling of 300 basis points.22
likely force the abandonment of any insistence on equal treatment by Southeast Asian governments. 
Regionalism would be better served by acknowledging the heterogeneity of its membership and accepting 
its practical implications when relating to multilateral institutions and other outside actors. 
Contributing Partnership
One could imagine more ambitious cooperation still between CMIM and the IMF. Sussangkarn (2010) 
raises the possibility of creating associate memberships or contributing partnerships in the CMIM in 
order to allow Australia, New Zealand, and/or India to participate short of full membership status. While 
not sitting in the governing bodies of the CMIM, nor eligible to borrow from it, these countries could 
contribute funds during an activation and attend surveillance and other meetings through associated 
status. The concept could be taken a step further to allow countries outside the region, such as the United 
States, and multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, to participate. The possibility that the IMF might 
top up financial packages by bilateral lending to members of a regional arrangement and by lending 
directly to the regional arrangement itself has been floated within the Fund.49 
One possible attraction of having the IMF lend to the CMIM, which would lend in turn to one 
of its members, would be to mobilize IMF resources without the stigma of the Fund. The proposal 
nonetheless raises several difficulties. First, the IMF would at the same time be relinquishing control over 
the terms on which the ultimate credit was advanced, which would be difficult for its Executive Board 
to swallow. Those terms would be decided by the governing bodies of the CMIM instead. Second, an 
amendment to the Articles of Agreement would be required to use the IMF’s General Resources Account 
(GRA) for this purpose.50 
There are also difficulties on the side of ASEAN+3 in IMF lending to the CMIM. First, as presently 
constituted, the CMIM is not in a position to receive a loan from the IMF or any other organization or 
country for that matter. The CMIM is a governance framework to jointly mobilize separately held reserves 
simultaneously and bilaterally. It is not a legal entity that can take on financial obligations on its own 
authority, such as the ADB or the IMF. Second, of course, using the CMIM as an intermediary in this 
way would require that ASEAN+3 abandon the IMF link. 
Institutional Interdependence 
The question as to how CMIM and the IMF should work together is central to the futures of both of 
them. The reason for this lies in the origins of Asian regionalism as a response to the policies of the IMF, 
49. IMF, The Fund’s Mandate—Future Financing Role, background staff paper, March 25, 2010, 20, available at
 http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2010/032510a.pdf.
50. But an amendment would not be necessary to draw on the non-GRA resources of the IMF for this purpose.23
as part of the broader multilateral context (Henning 2008), and the IMF’s response to this challenge. 
Consider first CMIM, then the IMF. 
Asian financial regionalism has been deeply ambivalent about the IMF, motivated by resentment 
of the institution yet facilitated by its presence. The CMI was a substitute for the Asian Monetary Fund 
proposed by the Japanese Ministry of Finance in 1997, a compromise among those officials (both within 
Japan and East Asia more broadly) wanting to retain ties to the multilateral regime and those wanting 
autonomy. However, the IMF link, which survived the transition from CMI to CMIM, inhibited the use 
of these arrangements in the recent crisis, owing to the “stigma” of the Fund in Asia. At the same time, 
the CMIM is too small to be viable in a crisis without additional financing from other sources, the IMF 
being the leading candidate. So, if the CMIM is going to be used in the foreseeable future and evolve, it 
will have to specify the modalities for working with the IMF. 
   The IMF is similarly dependent on striking a strong working relationship with ASEAN+3, 
having lost substantial credibility in East Asia after the 1997–98 crisis. Rehabilitating it within the region 
depends on (a) modifying its facilities and programs to better match the preferences of Asian members, an 
area where it has made great strides, and (b) cooperating with regional institutions including the CMIM. 
Through the latter, it can have a regional partner, imparting local ownership of the program. The IMF has 
therefore wisely sought to do more of both. 
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
This paper has argued that the cooperation between the IMF and European authorities in recent programs 
in Central and Eastern Europe, Greece, and Ireland, while successful, is not likely to be easily replicated 
in other regions. The European numerical dominance at the IMF and the European identity of the 
managing director—a person intimately familiar with the decision making machinery of the European 
Union, euro area, and key member states—makes the effectiveness of this cooperation unique to Europe. 
The increasing number and size of regional financial arrangements, severity of financial crises, and 
political constraints on lending raise the costs of potential failure of cooperation between regional funds 
and the IMF. The IMF and regional financial arrangements should therefore arrange key elements of 
cooperation in advance, rather than negotiate them in the midst of crises as they have done in the past. 
The G-20 finance ministers and summit meetings are the appropriate forums in which to discuss 
the relationship between the IMF and regional financial arrangements. The member states of the G-20 
are the leading members of both multilateral and regional financial institutions. These governments 
were principally responsible for creating both sets of institutions, while giving insufficient thought to 
coordinating the mandates and work among them, and are thus principally responsible for solving 
the problems thus created. The G-20 cannot dispose of these matters itself, but the group can prepare 24
decisions to be taken with the other members of the IMF and regional institutions to strengthen the 
connections between them.
The previous section offered several recommendations for ASEAN+3 and the IMF to cooperate 
with respect to surveillance and cofinancing. These could be extended to other regional financial 
arrangements. Specifically, regional funds in general could make qualification under the enhanced FCL 
and the PCL sufficient to satisfy their standards for disbursement and could disburse in parallel with IMF 
disbursements under a GSM or SLL, should one of those mechanisms eventually be introduced. The IMF 
should continue to support regional surveillance mechanisms, assist with their design, and share analysis 
with regional bodies. At the discretion of the member state undergoing review, in addition, the IMF could 
include regional secretariats in Article IV missions. The G-20 finance ministers and heads of government 
should advance proposals for their regional financial arrangements and the Fund to cooperate in these 
ways and encourage development of the GSM/SLL within the IMF. 
The diversity of regional arrangements poses an issue for the IMF’s cooperation with them. 
Specifically, Europe and East Asia exhibit substantially different regional preferences with respect to the 
size, timing, and conditionality attached to financing programs. Although the CMIM was designed as 
an ex post balance of payments facility to complement the IMF, few Asian countries are likely to require 
financing on this basis in the near future. Many Asian officials seek instead upfront commitments of large 
amounts of precautionary financing with little or no ex post conditionality to address systemic illiquidity 
in capital and banking markets or banking failures. European officials on the other hand face sovereign 
debt crises within the euro area, have imposed strong macroeconomic and structural conditions on an 
ex post basis, and are in the process of making their new facilities permanent while strengthening the 
fiscal rules and structural requirements of the monetary union. A couple of consequences follow from 
this divergence of regions. First, the principles and modalities of cooperation between the regions and 
the Fund must be general enough to embrace both types of regions yet also specific enough to provide 
meaningful guidance. Second, the IMF’s role is likely to differ from region to region.
This section offers a set of basic principles that should guide the design and organization of the 
practical modalities for cooperation. It then offers a set of guidelines for regional financial arrangements 
and the IMF in four specific areas. The section concludes with recommendations for adapting institutions 
at both levels. Together, these proposals constitute what might be described as an Interinstitutional 
Agenda for the G-20. 
Principles
The governments of member states of the regions and the IMF should be guided by three principles when 
considering the modalities of interinstitutional cooperation. 25
1. Specialization along comparative advantage. Regional institutions might have comparative advantage in 
local knowledge and ownership, for example, whereas the IMF has it with respect to universal risk pooling 
and insulation from backlash against austere conditionality. In crisis prevention and management, both 
sets of institutions can benefit from specialization according to comparative advantage and exchange. 
Because the operational capabilities and political characteristics of the regional facilities vary widely, 
though, the comparative advantage of the IMF will differ in each region. 
2. Prohibition against competition in critical areas. Financial stability can be served by competition between 
institutions in some select areas, such as the provision of quality information, analysis, and forecasts. 
But in other areas, such as terms of lending and policy conditionality, competition would be corrosive, 
pushing solutions away from the optimal tradeoff between adjustment and financing. Left to their own 
devices, institutions will not necessarily compete only in the appropriate areas. Member governments 
should establish clear understandings about where competition is acceptable and where their regional and 
multilateral institutions should avoid it. 
3. Transparency. Transparency varies significantly across regional arrangements and the IMF. Once 
relatively opaque, the IMF has become remarkably more transparent during the 13 years since the Asian 
financial crisis.51 The CMIM, on the other hand, has lagged; ASEAN+3 finance ministers have published 
a summary of the agreement establishing the CMIM but not the agreement itself.52 To diminish the 
likelihood of last-minute surprises in the negotiation of rescue packages, the terms and governance of 
multilateral and regional arrangements should be shared knowledge across both levels. Differences across 
facilities will tempt some parties to use the least transparent facility in a financial rescue. To facilitate 
public understanding and market credibility, regional financial facilities should be at least as transparent as 
the IMF. If differences persist, joint operations should adopt the disclosure protocol of the most, not least, 
transparent facility. 
Guidelines
With these principles in mind, the regional financial arrangements and the IMF should develop a set of 
more specific guidelines for region-IMF cooperation. Involving obligations for both the IMF and regional 
financial arrangements, these guidelines would address multilateral review of regional arrangements, 
conditionality, private-sector involvement, and seniority, among other matters. 
51. In addition, central banks’ swap agreements with the Federal Reserve are now posted at the time of the announcement 
of the agreement and drawings are reported weekly in Federal Reserve statistical releases. Federal Reserve, press release, 
Washington, May 11, 2010, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20100511a.htm. 
52. ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers, Joint Media Statement, Tashkent, Uzbekistan, May 2, 2010, available at  
http://www.aseansec.org/documents/JMS_13th_AFMM+3.pdf (accessed on August 30, 2010).26
Multilateral Review. The international community has reviewed the consistency of regional financial 
facilities with countries’ multilateral commitments in a completely ad hoc fashion or has failed to review 
them at all. There is no process or procedure through which such arrangements are evaluated formally. 
Some have been discussed by the IMF’s Executive Board, but neither the CMI, CMIM, NAFA, nor 
EFSF, for example, have been the focus of sustained board review. Such reviews are needed in order to (a) 
identify any potential conflicts between these arrangements and the IMF and (b) anticipate any sticking 
points in negotiations over parallel financing. It is far better to identify such snags in advance than to 
encounter them unexpectedly during eleventh-hour bargaining in a financial crisis. All members of the 
IMF, including the United States and European member states, should agree to present their regional 
arrangements to the Executive Board for review. 
Conditionality. Policy conditionality is of course a critical question in the relationship between the 
IMF and regional financial arrangements. While a relaxation of conditionality might be appropriate in 
some cases, the IMF and regional facilities must not ease the policy adjustments required of borrowers 
owing simply to competition with one another. Despite its acknowledged mistakes,53 the IMF still holds 
a general comparative advantage over other regional and multilateral organizations in the specification 
of program conditionality. The IMF holds this position by virtue of (1) its analytic resources and the 
experience and expertise of its staff, (2) its global perspective, which confers a unique ability to draw 
lessons across countries and regions, and (3) the reluctance of regional neighbors to impose harsh 
conditionality even when that is necessary. Note as well that the IMF has adapted its conditionality on 
Stand-By Arrangements considerably over the last several years and has now introduced facilities that 
attach no and only light ex post policy conditions.54 Until they develop their own capacities fully, regional 
financial arrangements are thus wise to import or borrow the IMF’s conditionality.
However, the comparative advantage of the IMF in this respect should not be considered 
sacrosanct.55 The Latvian program of 2008 represents a case where the preferences of the region prevailed 
over those of the IMF on an important element of policy adjustment. Most European Union officials 
argued against currency devaluation, which was favored by most leading members of the Fund staff and 
some members of the Executive Board. The managing director and responsible European commissioner 
53. Most recently, the Independent Evaluation Office offers a penetrating critique of the IMF during the 
mid-2000s; see IEO, IMF Performance in the Run-Up to the Financial and Economic Crisis: IMF Surveillance in 
2004–07, Washington, January 10, 2011. On its response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, see the Fund’s 
self-assessment in IMF, IMF Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand, 1999, Washington.
54. See, for example, Giorgianni (2009).
55. Note, for example, that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's Working Party no. 3 was 
probably more influential than the IMF with respect to surveillance of industrial countries through at least the mid-1980s, 
and it continues to cooperate on surveillance with the Fund.27
struck an agreement whereby the European position on this point was accepted and the European Union 
contributed a larger share of a larger overall package. The program has so far been quite successful (Åslund 
2010). In principle, if a regional arrangement develops analytically sound, high-quality conditionality,56 
it ought to be able to substitute it for IMF conditionality. The critical considerations are the quality of 
the program, not the institutional origin, and the operational coordination of the work of the region with 
that of the IMF. 
Bailing in the Private Sector. Recognizing a predominant concern in the resolution of recent and 
current financial crises, regional groups, their member states, and the IMF must avoid regulatory policies 
and guidance to the private sector that could undermine partners’ efforts to stabilize countries. Regional 
arrangements must not encourage banks to reduce their exposures to countries that have borrowed from 
the IMF, for example. Nor should the IMF undercut arrangements that might be agreed within the 
regions in the future regarding private-sector involvement and sovereign debt restructuring. Depending 
on the structure of regional banking markets, regions might have a comparative advantage in private-
sector involvement.57
Seniority. The IMF is unique among crisis-fighting facilities in the universality and diversity of its 
membership. It remains the final resort in efforts to combat regionwide and systemic financial crises. 
Whereas a regional financial facility can turn to the IMF if a regional operation fails, there is no fallback 
among international financial facilities if an IMF operation fails. The funding structure, terms of lending, 
and “revolving” nature of the Fund also distinguish it from most regional financial facilities.58 All of 
the IMF’s members have a strong, common interest in keeping the IMF at the pinnacle of the seniority 
ladder. The Executive Board, moreover, is unlikely to approve loans on any other basis than seniority. For 
these reasons, the IMF should retain the status of preferred creditor relative to other lenders and, when 
the time is right, this status should be formally recognized in its Articles.59 
56. Sound conditionality should be understood to mean policy adjustments that eliminate the financing gap in the 
medium term. Substantial analysis and debate surround the policy conditions that are appropriate for program lending, 
but that discussion is well beyond the scope of this paper. 
57. The European Banking Coordination Initiative (Vienna Initiative) of early 2009 was important for stabilizing Central 
and Eastern Europe and represents a successful example of interinstitutional cooperation. See Åslund (2010, 67–73). On 
the other hand, European authorities have opposed the imposition of “haircuts” on the senior holders of Irish bank debt 
out of fear of contagion to other banks in the euro area.
58. For discussion of the IMF as the most senior preferred creditor, see Martha (1990); Rieffel (2003, 31–41, 68–75); 
Roubini and Setser (2004, 252–63); Gelpern (2005, 2007).
59. For discussion of the merits of formalizing the hierarchy of creditors, see Gelpern (2005) and Roubini and Setser 
(2004, 277–87). Although these analysts are doubtful about the feasibility of doing so across a broad range of creditors, 
public and private, formalizing the relative status of the IMF and other official institutions would be a narrower and far 
simpler exercise. 28
  Ideally, these guidelines would be incorporated into a code of conduct governing the relationship 
between regional facilities and the IMF.60 Such a code could accommodate the substantial variation 
among regional arrangements. While a code of conduct would still be desirable, the G-20 and the 
institutions should advance cooperation along each of these substantive points independently if agreement 
on a more formal code cannot be achieved. Broad acceptance of these guidelines even as “soft” obligations 
would represent progress in organizing cooperation between financial institutions. 
The IMF is not in a position to dictate what is permissible in the way of regional financial 
agreements among its members. The purpose of the guidelines proposed here is not to give such 
jurisdiction to the Fund or to protect the bureaucratic interests of the institution. If a subgroup of 
member states wishes to create an “IMF-plus” regional arrangement and is willing to commit the 
resources to make it effective, then protecting the bureaucratic interest of the Fund cannot be a 
legitimate objection. But its comprehensive membership and cross-regional purview make the IMF the 
best institution in which to locate international consultation over regional arrangements. The practical 
inseparability of regional financing from IMF programs, at least for the moment, also makes the Fund the 
best location for coordination. 
Institutions
The third component of this agenda addresses changes to the structures and mandates of the IMF and 
regional institutions. 
First, regional financial arrangements should create clear and coherent mechanisms for external 
representation, in order to engage the IMF and other international financial institutions as regions. 
External representation of the euro area was largely an afterthought in the Maastricht Treaty and, while 
now established, is cumbersome and often contentious.61 No explicit arrangement for representation has 
been agreed among ASEAN+3; the IMF must engage with CMIM through its members, none of which 
appear to be formally authorized by the group to speak for the region. 
Second, for its part, the IMF and other international financial institutions should provide 
mechanisms for facilitating and receiving the collective representation of the regional institutions. The euro 
area is represented in the Executive Board under arrangements involving the EU presidency, Commission, 
60. Elsewhere (Henning 2002, 2006), I have proposed adoption of such a code and the financial equivalent of Article 
XXIV of the GATT and Article 5 of the GATS. The conflict between the Japanese Ministry of Finance and US Treasury, 
among other key actors, over the proposal to create an Asian Monetary Fund in 1997 might have been avoided if there 
had been clearer ex ante criteria for regional financial arrangements that were acceptable to the international community. 
Formal criteria and principles could preempt similar conflicts in the future and provide firm guidance for the creation and 
evolution of regional arrangements and the IMF. 
61. See, among others, Henning (1997, 2007a, 2007b); McNamara and Meunier (2002); Ahearne and Eichengreen 
(2007); Cœuré and Pisani-Ferry (2007).29
and European Central Bank.62 Though workable, the arrangement is complex and not at all clearly 
replicable in the case of other regions. Considerable streamlining is likely to be necessary if the Fund is 
to work simultaneously with a number of regions effectively. As this is done, care must be taken to avoid 
the double-veto problem, which arises when one member or a few members hold(s) a veto over a regional 
position, which in turn can veto a decision or otherwise stymie decision making in the IMF (Henning 
1997, 55–56). 
Third, IMF governance reform will have important bearing on the institution’s ability to cooperate 
with regions. Quota shares and voting power are in the process of being shifted toward emerging markets, 
Asian members in particular.63 The number of European seats in the Executive Board has recently been 
reduced by two in favor of emerging-market countries. When the present managing director departs, 
whenever that might be, the members of the IMF should appoint an Asian as his successor. Although 
more progress would be desirable, these reforms help to boost Asian confidence in and willingness 
to cooperate with the IMF. The members of the IMF and the G-20 should guard against weakening 
cooperation with Europe in the process, however, by establishing interinstitutional conventions on an ex 
ante basis. 
Finally, the agenda raises the twin questions of the eligibility to draw on IMF resources and 
membership of regional organizations in the IMF. Some analysts have proposed that the IMF lend to 
regional arrangements for on-lending to member states. Presently, under the Articles of Agreement 
only national governments can be members of the Fund and draw on its resources. IMF lending to 
a regional financial arrangement would thus require an amendment to the Articles that would either 
provide borrowing eligibility to nonmembers or membership to qualifying regions. The former would be 
difficult to accommodate under the existing financial structure of the Fund. The latter, while raising the 
conceptually intriguing prospect of creating a “Fund of regional funds,” goes well beyond what members 
would be now willing to contemplate. Nonetheless, as I have argued elsewhere, monetary unions that 
meet a high standard of cohesiveness and have adopted majority decision making should be accepted 
as members of the Fund, their member states having surrendered monetary sovereignty to the regional 
union (Henning 2006). Establishing unified membership for the euro area would certainly facilitate IMF 
62. See, for example, Aubrechtová, Coussens, and Pineau (2010); Mahieu, Ooms, and Rottier (2005); Bini-Smaghi 
(2004); Thygesen (1997); Maystadt (1997); Polak (1997).
63. Quota and voting reforms agreed in 2008 came into effect in March 2011, while reforms agreed in late 2010 are 
undergoing ratification by member governments. When completed, the two stages will more than double total quotas to 
about $750 billion and shift roughly 6 percent of total votes toward emerging-market and developing countries. See, IMF, 
“The IMF’s 2008 Quota and Voice Reforms Take Effect,” press release no. 11/64, March 3, 2011; IMF, “Quota and Voting 
Shares Before and After Implementation of Reforms Agreed in 2008 and 2010,” available at  
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pdfs/quota_tbl.pdf. 30
coordination with it and should be one of the key objectives of the next round of reform discussions in 
both the IMF and European Union. 
Membership for regions is closely related to the eligibility of member states for IMF financing. 
During the months leading up to the announcement of the 2010 rescue package for Greece, many 
officials in Europe sought to block drawings by Greece from the IMF. These officials preferred a wholly 
European solution in order to use the Greek crisis to strengthen European rules and institutions and, in 
some cases, to reduce the influence of outsiders. Despite the euro area’s ultimate embrace of the Fund, 
the motivation of some in Europe in creating the ESM and a generally more robust macroeconomic 
and structural regime is to avoid having to turn to the IMF in the future. If members of the euro area 
were someday made ineligible for loans from the Fund by European conventions or rules, however, 
the rationale for separate memberships by the European governments would evaporate. Membership 
would then logically devolve from the member states to the euro area. The same would apply to other 
regional institutions barring Fund drawings by members. Member states should then accept the logical 
consequences by reforming the membership rules and governing arrangements of the Fund accordingly. 
The principles, guidelines, and recommendations are offered here as elements of an Interinstitutional 
Agenda for consideration in the G-20 finance ministers and summit meetings, as well as within the 
regional and multilateral institutions themselves. National governments around the world have been 
building regional arrangements for several decades. With the CMIM and ASEAN+3 surveillance 
mechanisms now in place and Europe on the threshold of adopting a new permanent regime, now is the 
time to review and advance cooperation between regions and the IMF. The increasing size, complexity, 
and politicization of financial programs make ad hoc approaches to interinstitutional cooperation risky, 
especially for contingencies outside Europe. The international community will want to lay the basis for 
cooperation between regional facilities and the IMF during the present period of relative financial calm (at 
least outside Europe), before another wave of crises approaches.
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Table 1     Relationship between selected regional financial arrangements and the IMF
Name of fund Contributing members Purpose Size Relationship to the IMF
EU Balance of Payments 
Facilitya
All EU members Medium-term financial 
assistance for non-euro 
members of the 
European Union
€50 billion Not formally linked 
to IMF programs, but 
organized jointly in 
recent cases; members 





All EU members To address severe 
disturbances beyond 
members’ control; 
available to all EU 
members
€60 billion Not legally linked to IMF 
programs, but linked 




All members of the euro 
area
Preserve financial 
stability of monetary 
union via temporary 
financial assistance to 
euro area members 
(only) with exceptional 
problems beyond their 
control
€440 billion Not legally linked to IMF 
programs, but linked 
as a matter of Council 
policy and members’ 
domestic politics
Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralisation (CMIM)
Ten member states 
of ASEAN plus China, 
Japan, South Korea, and 
Hong Kong
Address balance 





$120 billion Beyond 20 percent of 
a country’s allotment, 
disbursements must 
be linked to an IMF 
program; not yet 
activated
Arab Monetary Fund Twenty-two Arab 
countries in North Africa 





through short- and 
medium-term credit 
facilities
$2.7 billion Ordinary loans are 
usually accompanied by 
an IMF program; other 
types of assistance are 
not necessarily linked
Latin American Reserve 
Fund
Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Costa Rica, 
Peru, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela
Support members’ 
balance of payments 
with credits and 
guarantees
$2.34 billion No role for the IMF
North American 
Framework Agreement




through 90-day central 
bank swaps, renewable 
up to one year
$9 billion US Treasury requires 
letter from IMF 
managing director
a. Formerly referred to as Medium-Term Financial Assistance (MTFA), which was created in 1988.
Sources: Henning (2002, 2009); IMF, background information on participating regional financial arrangements, Seminar on Regional Financial Safety Nets, 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.  Satisfy economic, monetary, and fiscal conditions of 
the IMF program, as well as meet certain reporting 
requirements. 
2.  Oil Agreement assured repayment through 
attachment of proceeds from Mexican oil exports. 
3.  Provide financial plan, and annual updates of the plan, 
submit to Treasury a written description of financial 
developments, the intended use(s) of the proposed 
funds, and how such use(s) are consistent with the 
financial plan 
 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/gg96056.pdf 
 
G‐10 central banks
k through Bank for International 
Settlements—US$10 billion 
 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1995/pr9510.htm 
Credit line; never activated
 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1995/pr9510.htm 
n.a. 
Commercial banks 
US$3 billion 
 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1995/pr9510.htm 
Never activated
n.a. 
k.  Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
 
 
 